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PROPOSED UNIFORM CHILD WITNESS
TESTIMONY ACT: AN IMPERMISSIBLE
ABRIDGEMENT OF CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS
Abstract: The judicial system is struggling to accommodate the special
needs of a rapidly growing number of child witnesses hi its courtrooms. An
increasingly popular approach to obtaining children's testimony is the use
of "shielding methods," which allow child witnesses to testify outside the
presence of the defendant. When courts use these methods, the judicial
system's obligation to protect children arguably conflicts with its duty to
ensure criminal defendants' right to confront their accusers as mandated
by the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. This Note examines the
most recent development in child witness shielding, the Uniform Child
Witness Testimony by Alternative Methods Act, drafted in 2002 by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. This Note
argues that states should not enact the proposed Act for several reasons.
The Act violates the Federal Confrontation Clause as well as many state
constitutions. Additionally, empirical evidence reveals harmful effects of
shielded testimony not only on criminal defendants, but. also on the child
witnesses themselves and on the judicial system as a whole. This Note
concludes that pretrial education and counseling would better serve child
witnesses without sacrificing defendants' constitutional rights.
INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, the number of children testifying in
courtroom proceedings has increased dramatically, primarily due to
more aggressive prosecution of child sexual abuse claims.t To ac-
commodate this influx of young witnesses, the judicial system has de-
veloped various procedural innovations designed to promote both
sensitivity to children within the legal process and a higher conviction
Terese L. Fitzpatrick, Note, Innocent Until Amen Guilty: Shallow Words for the Falsely Accused
in a Criminal Prosecution for Child Sexual Abuse, 12 U. BRIDGE:rpm .
 L. REV. 175, 175, 177-78
(1991); see Dorothy F. Marsil et al., Child Witness POUT Law Interfacing with Social Science, LAW &
CONIT.M111.. PROBS., Winter 2002, at 209, 209-10. From 1985-1990 alone, reports of child abuse
increased by thirty-one percent nationally. Hon. Barbara Gilleran-johnson & Timothy R. Ev-
ans, The Criminal Courtroom: Is It Child Proof!. 26 Loy. U. Cat. Lj. 681, 683 (1995).
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rate for child sexual abuse prosecutions. 2 This Note focuses on one
category of procedural techniques developed to enable children's
participation in court—witness shielding procedures. 3
The term "shielding procedure" encompasses a number of
methods by which child witnesses may avoid direct contact with the
defendant while testifying. 4 Federal and state courts most commonly
use three types of shielding procedures: screening, videotape, and
closed-circuit television. 5 Screening allows a child to testify inside the
courtroom with a barrier placed between him or her and the defen-
dant. 6 Videotaped testimony can be either contemporaneous or pre-
recorded. 7 Contemporaneous video testimony allows children to tes-
tify outside the courtroom during the trial and broadcasts their
statements live into the proceedings. 8 Prerecorded depositions of
children, however, are taped before the trial and replayed in the
courtroom,9 Finally, closed-circuit television instantly transmits the
child's out-of-court direct and cross-examinations into the trial pro-
ceedings."' Closed-circuit television can be either one-way (those pre-
sent in the courtroom can see and hear the child, but the child can-
not see or hear the courtroom activity) or two-way (children can see
and hear the courtroom proceedings)."
Shielding procedures are controversial because they technically
violate the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, which provides
that in all criminal prosecutions "the accused shall enjoy the right ... to
be confronted with the witnesses against him." 12 Traditionally, defen-
dants' Sixth Amendment confrontation rights have been satisfied
2 Barbara Hobday Owens, Comment, Videotaped Child Testimony and the Confrontation
Clause: Are They Reconcilable?, 14 U. DAYTON L. REV. 361, 361-62 (1989); see Fitzpatrick, supra
note 1, at 176.
5 See Owens, supra note 2, at 361-62.
See Marsil et al.. supra note 1, at 209-10.
5 Id.; see Janet Leach Richards. Protecting the Child Witness in Abuse Cases, 34 FAtI. L.Q.
393, 399-101 (2000).
6 See Marsil et al., supra note 1, at 209-10; Richards, supra note 5, at 401; see also Coy v.
Iowa, 487 U.S, 1012, 1012 (1988) (analyzing the constitutionality of a screening device
placed between witnesses and defendant).
'Richards, supra note 5. at 403.
Id. .
9 Id.
w Sec Mark A. Small & Ira M. Schwartz. Policy Implications for Children's Law in the After-
math of Maryland v. Craig, 1 St'wr4 HALL CONST. L.J. 109, 111 (1990); see also Maryland V.
Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 840-42 (1990) (analyzing the constitutionality of child testimony via
one-way closed-circuit television).
11 Small & Schwartz, supra note 10, at 111.
12 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI; Owens, SUM note 2, at 363.
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through a requirement that witnesses testify face to face with the ac-
cused at trial." The rationale behind the Confrontation Clause is the
presumption that people are Less likely to lie under oath, particularly
when facing the accused." Shielding procedures, however, prevent tra-
ditional face-to-face interaction between witnesses and defendants."
As shielding procedures proliferate in courtrooms, the judicial sys-
tem is struggling to accommodate two of its most important interests
and duties—its obligation to assure defendants a fair trial as mandated
by the Sixth Amendment and its parens patriae duty to protect chil-
dren." The premise of shielding procedures is the notion that court-
room confrontation with the defendant, the alleged perpetrator, may
severely traumatize child witnesses." Therefore, the legislative and judi-
cial trend has been primarily in favor of introducing more procedural
protections for child witnesses, particularly in sexual abuse trials."
The most recent development in child witness testimony comes
via the Uniform Child Witness Testimony by Alternative Methods Act
(the "Child Witness Act") drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") in the summer
of 2002. 19 The Child Witness Act addresses the innovations that have
flourished during the last twenty years, tackling the lack of uniformity
that exists among state statutes with respect to the procedures by
which judges admit children's testimony." The American Bar Associa-
tion (the "ABA") approved the Child Witness Act in February 2003,
13 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016-17, 1019-20; sceU .S. CoNs'''. amend. VI.
14
 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019-20; see Wallace J. Mlyniec & Michelle M. Daily, See No Evilt Can
Insulation of Child Sexual Abuse Victims Be Accomplished Without Endangering the Defendant's
Constitutional Rights?. 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 115, 123 (1985); see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. V1.
18 Marsil et al.. supra note 1, at 209-10; Owens, supra note 2, at 363.
18 See Jacqueline Miller Beckett, Note, The True Value of the Confrontation Clause: A Study
of Child Sex Abuse Trials, 82 Co. L.J. 1605. 1622 (1994); see also U.S. CoNs'r. amend. VI.
"Parens patriae" is a term defining the state's legal role in protecting the interests of chil-
dren. Nancy Ashe, What You Need to Know About Adoption, at littp://adoption.abotit.comili-
brary/glossary/bldef-parpat.hun (last visited Jan, 14. 2004).
17 Marsil at al., supra note 1, at 213.
18 Fitzpatrick. supra note 1. at 208; see Beckett, supra note 16, at 1606.
19 Molly McDonough, Model Act Brings Uniformity to Malmo?! of Child Witnesses, 1 No. 34
A.B.A. j. E-REPowr 4 (Sept. 6, 2002); Recently Completed Uniform Act Covers Testimony by Child
Witnesses, 71 U.S.L.W, 2137, 2137 (Aug. 27. 2002) (hereinafter Recently Completed Uniform
Act); see UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALTERNATIVE METHODS Acr (2002). The
text of the Child Witness Act is available at littp://www.law.topenn.eclu/b11/tdc/
ucwthanta/2002final.hun (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
20
 McDonough, supra note 19; see generally UNIE. CHILD WITNESS TES -I1MONY 131' Al.-
TERNATIvE Alrrnons ACT.
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thereby allowing individual state legislatures to consider enacting it
themselves. 21
Section 2(1) of the Child Witness Act defines an "alternative
method" as
a method by which a child testifies which does not include
all of the following: (A) having the child present in person
in an open forum; (B) having the child testify in the pres-
ence and full view of the finder of fact and presiding officer;
and (C) allowing all of the parties to he present, to partici-
pate and to view and be viewed by the child. 22
Section 2(1)(C) encompasses shielding procedures by allowing a
child to testify outside the presence or view of the defendant. 23 In the
drafters' Comment to section 2, they explain that the Child Witness
Act is intended to permit not only any shielding procedure currently
employed by states but also any technology developed in the future. 24
Section 4 of the Child lAiiiness Act provides for a pretrial hearing
at which the judge determines whether to allow a particular child wit-
ness to testify by an alternative method that comes within the section
2(1) definition.25 Section 5 of the Child Witness Act describes two
separate standards applicable to criminal and non-criminal proceed-
ings, respectively.26 In criminal proceedings, shielding procedures can
be employed when the judge finds, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the child would stiffer "serious emotional trauma" if required to
testify face to face with the defendant. 27 Filially, section 6 of the Child
Witness Act provides a non-exclusive list of factors for the judge to
consider in his or her pretrial determination, including available
means to protect the child without using a shielding method, the na-
21 Press Release, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. ABA
Approves Six NCCUSL Acts. http://www.liccusl.orginccusl/DesktopModules/NewsDisplay .
aspx?ltemID=45 (Feb. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Press Release].
22 UNIV. CIIILD WITNESS TE.s . rtorn• BY ALTERNATIVE METHODS ACT § 2(1).
23 Id. § 2(1)(C).
24 Id. § 2 tint.
23 Id.§§ 2(1), 4.
26 Id. § 5. Sections 2(3) and (4) of the Child Witness Act define a criminal proceeding
as, "a trial or hearing before a court in a prosecution of a person charged with violating a
criminal law of this State" and a noncriminal proceeding as, "a trial or hearing before a
court or an administrative agency of this State having judicial or quasi-judicial powers,
other than a criminal proceeding.' Id. § 2(3)—(4).
UNIF. CII1LD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALTERNATIVE METHODS ACT § 5.
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ture of the case, the importance of the child's testimony, and the na-
ture and degree of emotional trauma. 28
Despite approval of the Child Witness Act by NCCUSL and most
recently, the ABA, many Legal scholars, lawyers, and judges are con-
cerned that shielding procedures impermissibly erode the rights of the
accused. 29 Opponents of shielding procedures contend that face-to-face
confrontation is a necessary safeguard for criminal defendants. 3° In
fact, by some estimates, sixty-five percent. of sexual abuse reports are
unfounded. 31
 A false accusation of abuse, even if retracted or dis-
proved, could potentially be devastating to the lives of suspected perpe-
trators, 32 Ultimately, underlying the controversy surrounding shielding
procedures are the risks inherent in all criminal proceedings—
convicting the innocent or exculpating the guilty 33
This Note analyzes the appropriateness of the Child Witness Act in
terms of its constitutionality and societal ramifications. 34 Part I summa-
rizes Federal Confrontation Clause case law. 35 Part IA outlines the U.S.
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal Confrontation Clause
over the last century, preceding the issue of child witness shielding pro-
cedures. 39 Part I.B describes the Court's opinion in 1988, in Coy v. Iowa,
in which it. first addressed a constitutional challenge to a child shielding
procedure." Part I.0 summarizes the Court's most recent decision re-
garding child witness shielding in Maryland v. Craig, in 1990, which has
influenced the last decade of testimonial innovations, including the
Child Witness Act. 38
Part. II compares textual and interpretive differences among state
confrontation clauses with respect to the standards states have devel-
2a M.§ 6.
29 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 860-62 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Beckett. supra note 16, at 1606;
Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 208; see also UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALTERNATIVE
Mxisions AcT; Press Release, supra note 21.
3° See Lisa Donahue, Confrontation in Massachusetts: What "Face to Face" Really Means, 3
SUFFOLK. TRIAL & APP. Anvoc. 37,47-48 (1998).
31 Fitzpatrick. supra note 1, at 196; sec Brian L. Schwalb, Note, Child Abuse Thais and the
Confrontation of •auntatised Witnesses: Defining -Confrontation" to Protect Both Children and
Defendants, 26 HMSv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 185.185-86 (1991).
32 See Robin W. Morey, Continent, The Competency Requirement for the Child Victim of Sex-
ual Abuse: Must We Abandon It!, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 245,245-48 (1985).
33 Sec Craig, 497 U.S. at 867-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Morey, supra note 32, at 245-48.
34 Sec infra notes 48-301 and accompanying text.
35 Sec infra notes 48-117 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 62-87 and accompanying text.
38 Sec infra notes 88-117 and accompanying text.
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oped to hear child witness testimony. 39 Part III provides an overview of
relevant empirical research exploring children's testimony. 4° Part III.A
describes a group of studies about the psychological effects of shielding
procedures:" Part III.B summarizes studies connecting children's sug-
gestibility with false accusations. 42 Part LII.0 explores the emotional ef-
fects of testifying in open court on children.°
In Part IV, this Note argues that states should not enact the pro-
posed Child Witness Act for three reasons:" Part IV.A describes how
the Child Witness Act violates the Federal Constitution, falling below
the minimum standards it sets for protection of the accused.° Part
IV.B argues that the Child Witness Act violates many state constitu-
tional provisions.° Finally, in Part IV.C, this Note asserts that the Child
Witness Act exacerbates harmful effects of shielded testimony both on
witnesses and on defendants as revealed by empirical evidence. 47
I. FEDERAL CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CASE LAW
A. Early Intopretations of the Confrontation Clause
By permitting child witnesses to testify outside defendants' pres-
ence, shielding procedures technically violate the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause, giving rise to constitutional challenges.° The
dispute arises because the Federal Confrontation Clause does not ex-
pressly require face-to-face confrontation, despite general acceptance
of that interpretation. 49 This Section highlights the leading Federal
Confrontation Clause cases that provided guidance to the U.S. Su-
preme Court in its later decisions regarding child witness shielding
procedures. 50
39 See infra notes 118-165 and accompanying text.
4° See infra notes 166-225 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 172-194 and accompanying text.
42 SCC infra notes 195-212 and accompanying text.
43 Sec infra notes 213-225 and accompanying text.
44 Sec infra notes 226-301 and accompanying text.
45 Sec infra notes 231-267 and accompanying text.
46 Sec infra notes 268-281 and accompanying text.
42 Sec infra notes 282-301 and accompanying text.
48 Owens, supra note 2, at 363.
49 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI; see Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,844 (1990).
5° Sec infra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
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In 1895, in Mattox v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court first
interpreted the Confrontation Clause. 51
 In his appeal of a murder
conviction, defendant. Clyde Mattox challenged the admission of ear-
lier recorded statements by witnesses deceased before the tria1. 52 The
Court. held such prior testimony by the deceased declarants admissi-
ble." In ciloing so, however, the Court acknowledged two rights em-
bedded in the Confrontation Clause—the right to cross-examination
(which had previously received much more legal attention) and the
right of confrontation between accused and witness. 54
In 1899, in Kirby v. United States, the Court. declared the Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation as one of the fundamental guaran-
tees of life and liberty." The Kirby Court reversed and remanded the
lower court's indictment of the defendant. on felony larceny charges."
The Court held that the lower court erred in admitting the conviction
records of three men, separately charged and tried for an allegedly
related offense, who did not appear as witnesses in defendant Joseph
Kirby's tria1. 57
 The opinion emphasized the importance of direct con-
frontation between the accused and witnesses against him. 58
Reflected in the Mattox and Kirby opinions is an emphasis on am-
ple safeguards to protect the accused from false convictions. 59
 Direct
confrontation of a witness in front of the jury challenges the witness's
memory, perception, and sincerity." Therefore, face-to-face encoun-
ters between the accused and accuser, as noted by the Mattox Court.
51
 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); Troy A. Cotton, Comment, Maryland v. Craig: The Su-
preme Court Clarifies When a Child Protective Statute Which Allows a Child Witness to Testify Outside
the Presence of the Accused Will Violate the Confrontation Clause, 19 T MARSHALL L. Rtv. 309. 313
(1994),
52 Melina., 156 U.S. at 237-38, 240.
65 Sec id. at 243-44.
61 Troy Fuhriman, State v. Foster: Washingion State Undermines Confrontation Rights to Pro-
tect Child Witnesses, 36 GONZ. L. Km 7, 12-13 (2001); Owens. supra note 2, at 365; see Mat-
lox. 156 U.S. at 242-43; Cotton. supra note 51, at 313-14. The Matto: case was decided on
hearsay grounds not relevant to this discussion. See 156 U.S. at 240-44.
65 Sec 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899).
56 Id. at 47-48, 60-61.
57 Id. at 60-61.
68 Id. at 55.
59
 Sec id.; Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43; Tarek Howard, Note. Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions:
Protecting the Child Victim and Presenting the Rights of the Accused, 66 N.D. L. REV. 687, 690-91
(1990).
6° Sec Mlyniec R Daily. supra note 14, at 118, 123 (cit'uig Herbert r. Superior Court, 117
Cal. App. 3d 661 (1981)); Howard, supra note 59, at 691; Schwan). supra note 31, at 190-91.
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and reiterated in its progeny, have long been thought to be among
the most important and reliable safeguards of justice."
B. Coy v. Iowa: The U.S. Supreme Court Requires Face-to-Face
Confrontation in the Child Witness Context
As lower courts began to struggle with an increased volume of
child witnesses in the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court was challenged
to elaborate on its interpretation of the right to confront beyond Mat-
lox and Kilt.62 The Court's challenge was to determine whether the
Confrontation Clause mandates face-to-face interaction, despite an
absence of express language to that effect, which would prohibit child
witness testimony outside the defendant's presence. 63 This Section
describes the 1988 Coy v. Iowa decision, in which the Court first ad-
dressed children's shielded testimony with respect to the Confronta-
tion Clause." In Coy, the Court held that the Confrontation Clause
required face-to-face interaction—prohibiting child witnesses from
testifying outside the defendant's presence but deferring the question
of possible public policy-based exceptions. 65
In Goy, the defendant was charged with sexual assault of two thir-
teen-year-old girls camping near his backyard. 66 At trial, the district
court allowed a screen to be placed in front of the girls during their
testimony.° The girls could not see the defendant, but the defendant
could see the victims' outlines and hear their voices. 68 On appeal of his
conviction, defendant John Coy argued that the screening device,
authorized by an Iowa statute, violated his Sixth Amendment right to
61 See Mlyniec & Daily, supra note 14, at 117; Hmvard, supra note 59, at 690-92. 703-04;
see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,157 (1970) (recognizing historical interpretation
of the Confrontation Clause as the literal right to face the witness at trial); Mattox, 156 U.S.
at 242-43. In March 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its latest decision regarding the
general requirements of the Confrontation Clause. Sec Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.Ct.
1354.1359 (2004). In Crawford, Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, held that
the Sixth Amendment requires in-court testimony by witnesses unless they are unavailable
or have already been subject to cross-examination in another proceeding, thus reempha-
sizing the necessity of face-to-face confrontation. Id. at 1369.
62 See Fuhrirnan, supra note 54, at 12-13; Marsil et al., supra note 1, at 209-10; Cotton,
supra note 51, at 313-15.
63 See Fuhriman, supra note 54. at 12-13; Cotton, supra note 51, at 313; see also U.S.
Coast. amend. VI.
64 See infra notes 65-87 and accompanying text.
65 487 U.S. 1012,1020-21 (1988).
66 Id. at 1014.
67 Id. at 1014-15.
66 Id.
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confront the two young girls face to face 69 The lower courts held that
the screening device did not hinder the defendant's ability to cross-
examine the alleged victims and thus preserved his confrontation
right.% By taking that position, the Iowa courts rejected the interpreta-
tion of a face-to-face requirement within the Confrontation Clause.'"
Justice Antonin Scalia, in his Coy plurality opinion, looked first to
the origins of Western legal culture. 72 Justice Scalia noted that the right
to confrontation was recognized under Roman law and early English
law. 73 He also examined the Latin roots of the word—"contra," mean-
ing "against," and "frons," meaning "forehead," as well as a quotation
from Shakespeare referring to "face to face" encoutiters. 74 Justice Scalia
then pointed to more modern incarnations of the phrase, including,
"Look me in the eye and say that."76 Through these references, he illus-
trated the traditional and historical notion that accusation is not just
without direct confrontation.%
Justice Scalia cited the Court's 1970 holding in California v. Green
for its proclamation that the "literal right to confront" is essential to
the values promoted by the Confrontation Clause. 77 In that case, the
Court upheld John Green's drug conviction, finding no violation of
the Confrontation Clause when the prior statements of witnesses were
achnitted at trial.% Justice Scalia also relied on the Kirby Court's state-
ment that facts provided by witnesses can only be proved by those
whom the defendant can face at trial. 79
In light of these historical, cultural, and judicial references, Justice
Scalia reasserted that the Sixth Amendment goes beyond cross-
examination to a right of confrontation. 8° Using a literal interpretation
of the word "confrontation," he emphasized that face-to-face contact at
trial between accuser and accused is, and always has been, essential to
that right.81 Justice Scalia reasoned that this direct interaction was nec-
essary to ensure the integrity of the fact-finding process because wit-
es Id.
7° See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1015.
71 Sec id.
72 Id. at 1015-16.
72 Id.
74
 Id. at 1016 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD 11, act I, sc. 1).
75 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1018.
7° . at 1018-19.
77 Id. at 1017 (citing Green, 399 U.S. at 157).
78 Green, 399 U.S. at 151,158. The Green case was decided on hearsay grounds. Id. at 158.
79 See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016-17 (citing Kirby, 174 U.S. at 55).
8° Id. at 1015-20.
81 Id. at 1016-17.
476	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 45:467
tresses are less likely to lie when they have to "'repeat [their] story
looking at the man whom [they] will harm greatly.''' 82 He added that,
although in-court confrontation may upset witnesses, it may also reveal
false accusations or evidence of coaching.83
Turning to the particular screening device used in defendant
Coy's trial, Justice Scalia pronounced its use to be a flagrant violation
of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right. 84 In response to the
State's argument that the necessity of protecting sexual abuse victims
outweighed the constitutional right at stake, Justice Scalia conceded
that Sixth Amendment rights are not absolute. 85 Justice Scalia, how-
ever, was unwilling to compromise confrontation rights, primarily be-
cause of the Iowa statute's presumption of trauma for all child victims
of sexual abuse.88 Deferring the question of whether exceptions to the
Confrontation Clause exist, Justice Scalia indicated that the Constitu-
tion would require individualized findings that a particular witness
required special protection, supported by an important public policy,
before permitting an abridgement of defendants' rights. 87
C. Maryland V. Craig: The U.S. Supreme Court Permits Exceptions to
Face-to-Face Confrontation for Child Witnesses
As noted in the previous Section, two primary concepts emerged
from Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Coy: first, a literal reading of
the Confrontation Clause as the defendant's right to meet all wit-
nesses face to face at trial and second, the possibility of a compelling
public policy exception upon individualized findings. 88 This Section
describes the U.S. Supreme Court's application and expansion of that
holding two years later in Maryland v. Craig. 89
In its 1990 Craig opinion, the Court upheld an exception to face-
to-face confrontation based on individualized findings.94 Pursuant to a
state shielding slatute, the Maryland circuit court permitted young wit-
nesses to testify via one-way closed-circuit television in a sexual abuse
88 Id. at 1019 (quoting Z. CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGs or LIBERTY 35 (1956)).
as Id. at 1020.
84 Sec Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020.
85 Id.
88 Id. at 1021.
87 Id. at 1020-21.
88 See id.; Starsil el al., supra note 1, at 212.
89 See infra notes 90-117 and accompanying text.
9 497 U.S. at 849, 853.
20041	 Uniform Child Witness Testimony Act 	 477
case arising from the defendant's operation of a preschoo1. 91 The Court
then rejected defendant Sandra Ann Craig's objection that the shield-
ing procedure violated her Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. 92
To begin its analysis, the Court had to determine whether excep-
tions to the Confrontation Clause were indeed permissible—exploring
further Justice Scalia's suggestion of a possible policy-based exception
in Coy.93 The Craig majority acknowledged that the Confrontation
Clause has traditionally provided defendants with the right to meet.
face to face with witnesses s` 1 Nevertheless, the Court then held that the
Confrontation Clause does not guarantee an absolute right to face-to-
face confrontation.° Concluding that precedents demonstrate merely
a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial, the Craig majority
affirmed that exceptions to that right—shielding procedures—are
permissible 9G Shielding procedures must be both reliable and neces-
sary to further a compelling state interest. 97
In its assessment of reliability, the Craig majority adopted a func-
tional approach - to the Confrontation Clause, attaching great weight
to the particular characteristics of the closed-circuit method at issue."
The Court reasoned that reliability was preserved because the one-way
closed-circuit testimony kept intact the "essence" of the Confrontation
Clause through oath, cross-examination, and observation of the wit-
nesses' demeanor. 99 The direct and cross-examinations in Craig were
obtained in a separate room in the presence of the prosecutor and
defense counsel.m The testimony was then broadcasted live into the
courtroom for the judge, jury, and defendant's observation. 10 ' The
witnesses could not see or hear the courtroom or defendant, but the
defendant could hear the witnesses and communicate electronically
with her attorney. 102 Conceding the presumption of enhanced accu-
racy in direct confrontation, the majority held the one-way closed-
91 Id. at 840-41.
112 Id. at 842, 857.
93 Id. at 844-45; Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021.
04 497 U.S. at 844.
" Id.
" Id. at 849.
97 Id. at 850.
98 See id. at 851; Schwalb, supra time 31, at 209-10.
" See Craig, 997 U.S. at 846, 857.
I" Id. at 841-42.
101 Id.
102 Id.
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circuit television testimony to be the functional equivalent of tradi-
tional, in-court testimon): 103
After concluding the statute's procedure was adequately reliable,
the Craig Court next addressed the necessity of Maryland's asserted
state interest—the protection of child abuse victims from the trauma
of testifying." Giving deference to the Maryland legislature, the
Court considered evidence of the policy's importance based on simi-
lar state statutes, precedent that recognized the same interest, and
academic literature." The Court held that, given an adequate show-
ing of necessity for each individual witness, Maryland's asserted inter-
est in protecting child abuse victims was sufficiently compelling to
warrant a shielding procedure.'"
The Craig majority then articulated a three-prong test for assess-
ing the necessity of a shielding procedure to further the asserted state
interest. 107 The requirements are (1) a case-specific finding with re-
spect to each child witness; (2) trauma to the child caused by defen-
dant rather than by the courtroom, generally; and (3) distress that is
more than de minimis—more than anxiety, nervousness, or reluc-
tance." The CraigCourt determined that the Maryland statute, on its
face, satisfied all three requirements."
After the Craig decision, Congress responded to the trend to-
wards enhanced protection of child witnesses by enacting the Child
Victims' and Child Witnesses' Rights (the "CVCWR") statute in
1990. 110 The CVCWR statute provides a standard for federal courts
and applies the public policy exception to face-to-face confrontation
103 Id. at 846, 851.
1°4
	 U.S. at 851-52.
1 °5 Id. at 852-55. In 1990, thirty-seven states had authorized use of videotaped testi-
mony for sexually abused children; twenty-four permitted one-way closed-circuit television;
and eight allowed two-way closed-circuit television in their courtrooms. Id. at 853 & n.2,
854 & nn,3-4. Sec generally Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982)
(identifying compelling state interest in protecting minor victims of sex crimes from fur-
titer distress).
10° Craig, 497 U.S. at 855.
in Id. at 855-56; Bennett L. Gershman, Child Witnesses and Procedural Fairness, 24 Am. J.
TRIAL Aovoc. 585, 598-99 (2001).
1 °8 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 855-56; Gershmau, supra note 107. at 598-99. As differenti-
ated from the flawed Iowa statute in Coy, which presumed trauma for all child victims of
abuse, the Maryland statute in Craig expressly required an individualized showing of "seri-
ous emotional distress" that hinders communication. Compare Craig, 497 U.S. at 855, with
Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021.
109 497 U.S. at 855-57.
110 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (Stipp. II 1990), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (1996); see Gilleran-
Johnson & Evans, supra note 1, at 692; Richards, supra note 5, at 399-401.
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articulated by the Craig majority.''' yet, the federal statute deviates
from Craig in several respects, such as allowing different shielding
methods like videotape and two-way closed-circuit television, instead
of the one-way closed-circuit procedure approved by the Court.'" In
1993, in United Slates v. Garcia, a defendant challenged the CVCWR
statute in the Ninth Circuit as an unconstitutional departure from the
Craig holding)" The Ninth Circuit upheld the federal statute's consti-
tutionality despite its textual deviation from C•aig.'"
Today, Craig retains its status as the U.S. Supreme Court's most
recent opinion on the issue of child witness shielding procedures. 115
Subsequent. statutes, including the Federal CVCWR statute, state pro-
visions, and the new Child Witness Act approved by the ABA, purport
to follow the Court's guidelines in Craig." 6
 Still, the U.S. Supreme
Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of any shielding statute
since the specific Maryland provision at issue in Craig." 7
II. STATE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CASE LAW
The U.S. Supreme Court cases in Part I described the Federal
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and interpretations of the
protections it provides to criminal defendants. 119
 Likewise, each state
has a confrontation provision embedded in its state constitution. 119
Although each state confrontation, clause describes the rights of the
accused at trial, the texts of those clauses differ in some instances
from the Federal Confrontation Clause. 129 This Part describes textual
variations among state confrontation clauses and the impact those
variations have upon the permissibility of witness shielding proce-
dures in state courtrooms. 121
111 Gilleran-Johnson & Evans, supra note 1, at 692; Richards, supra note 5. at 399-401;
see 18 U.S.C. § 3509.
112 Gilleran-Johnson & Evans, supra note 1, at 692; Richards, sirpin note 5, at 399-401;
see 18 U.S.C. § 3509.
" 5 United States v. Garcia, 7 F.3d 885,888 (9th Cir. 1993).
114 Id.
115 See 497 U.S. at 849-50.
116 See, e.g., UNIF. CHILD WITNISS TESTIMONY BY AMITRNATIVE ME -11101)S ACT§ 5 cmt.
(2002).
117 See Howard, supra note 59, at 701.
119 Sec supra notes 48-117 and accompanying text.
" 9 Sec Beckett. supra note 16, at 1612-13; Donahue, supra note 30, at 42-46.
120 See Donahue, supra note 30. at 41-46.
121 Sec infra notes 122-165 and accompanying text.
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Under the U.S. form of government, the Federal Bill of Rights,
which includes the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, generally
sets the threshold for citizens' rights, below which state governments
may not fall in their own provisions. 122 State legislatures are free to be-
stow upon their citizens equal or greater rights than those afforded by
the federal government.'" Because each state can draft its own consti-
tution, textual and interpretive variations among slate provisions are
common. 124
With specific regard to confrontation clauses, the texts of state
constitutions fall into two categories. 125 First, thirty-three state confron-
tation clauses contain language identical to the Federal Sixth Amend-
ment, providing a defendant "the right ... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him." 128 These states allow child witness shielding
through application of the Maryland v. Craig decision, which held that
face-to-face confrontation was not mandator); partially due to the ab-
sence of that phrase within the Federal Confrontation Clause. 127
The remaining seventeen state constitutions, however, differ from
the Federal Confrontation Clause by providing defendants the express
right "to meet face to face" the witnesses against them. 128 Therefore,
the challenge for those states is determining whether their explicit
"face to face" language disallows the Craig Court's public policy excep-
tion to direct confrontation between witnesses and the accused. 129 if a
state's confrontation clause does not permit public policy exceptions to
122 See Donahue, supra note 30, at 47-48.
123 See id.
124 See id. at 42-46.
125 Sec id.
128 Sec. e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15 ("The defendant in a criminal case has the right ...
to be confronted with the witnesses against [hint]."); see also infra note 128 (listing state
constitutions that differ from the Federal Confrontation Clause).
127 See Donahue, supra note 30. at 44-45; sec also U.S. CONST. art. VI; Maryland v. Craig,
497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990). For example, Connecticut's confrontation clause language
matches the federal version, and it allows videotaped testimony in child sexual abuse cases.
Donahue, supra note 30, at 44-45 (citing State v. Jarzbeck, 529 A.2d 1245, 1256 (Conn.
1987)).
128 Compare U.S. CONST. art. VI, with ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 24, Coto. CoNs -r. art. II,
§ 16, Dta.. CoNsT. art. I, § 7, IND, CoNs -r. art. I, § 13, K. CONST. § 10, Kr. CONST. § 11,
MASS. CONST. art. XII, Mo. CONST. art. I, § 18(a), MONT. CONST. art. II, § 24, NEB. CONS'''.
art. I, § 11, N.H. CONST. art. XV, Onto CONST. art. I, § 10, OR. CONST. art. I, § 11, SA
CONST. art. VI, § 7, TENN. CONST. art I, § 9, WASH, CONST. art. I, § 22, and Wis. CONST. art.
I, § 7.
129 Donahue, supra note 30, at 42.
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face-to-face testimony, child witness shielding procedures would violate
the state constitution. 13°
States whose constitutions contain the phrase "face to face" have
used either functional or literal approaches to resolve the child wit-
ness shielding controversy. 131
 States using the literal approach, like
Justice Scalia did in his Coy v. Iowa plurality opinion, interpret the
"face to face" language as a strict requirement of direct confrontation
between witnesses and the accused. 132 States adopting the functional
approach interpret their confrontation clauses more Fl exibly',y, like the
Craig majority, and allow witnesses to avoid face-to-face confrontation
with defendants via shielding methods.'"
Massachusetts, for example, is among the seventeen states whose
constitutions include the explicit "face to face" language. 134 In the con-
text of child witness shielding, Massachusetts has employed a literal
interpretive approach. 135
 Therefore, Massachusetts courts do not per-
mit the Craig Court's exception to face-to-face confrontation, thereby
requiring all child witnesses to testify in front of the accused. 13°
In defense of the face-to-face requirement for child witnesses,
Massachusetts judges look to the intent of the drafters of the state
confrontation clause. 137
 Massachusetts was the first state explicitly to
guarantee defendants the right to meet accusers "face to face" in arti-
cle 12 of its constitution.'" The legislative history of article 12 reveals
a deliberate deviation by the state from other pre-existing states' con-
frontation clauses, none of which contained the "face to face" Ian-
guage. 139
 Instead, Massachusetts legislators sought to provide en-
hanced protection to criminal defendants, a trend which state judges
13° Sec id. at 42-46.
13 ' See id.; Schwalb, supra note 31, at 209-10.
132 See Donahue, supra note 30, at 42-44; Schwalb, supra note 31, at 209-10.
133 Sec Donahue, supra note 30, at 44-45; Schwa), supra note 31, at 209-10.
134 See MAss. CONS•, art. XII ("Every subject shall have a right ... to meet the witnesses
against him face to face ...."); supra note 128 and accompanying teat.
"3 See Donahue, supra note 30, at 42-44.
"9 Sec id. at 43.
137 Id. at 46; sce Commonwealth v. Johnson, 631 N.E.2d 1002,1005 (Mass. 1994); Beck-
ett, supra note 16, at 1612-13.
138 Donahue, supra note 30, at 42; see MASS. CoNs•. art. XII.
"9 Beckett, supra note 16, at 1612-13; sec Johnson, 631 N.E.2d at 1005. The origin of
Massachusetts's face-to-face confrontation requirement dates back to the Salem witch trials
of the seventeenth century. Beckett, supra note 16, at 1612-13. The state legislature issued
such a mandate in 1692 upon the recommendation of Reverend Increase Mather, then
President of Harvard College, who pronounced, It was better that ten suspected witches
should escape than one innocent person should be condemned .... I had rather judge a
witch to be an honest woman than judge an honest woman as a witch.* Id.
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have continued in the child witness context despite the state legisla-
ture's enactment of a shielding statute in the 1980s."°
The 1988 Commonroealth v. Bergstrom opinion demonstrates the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's position on the state's child
witness shielding statute, holding that the procedure allowing the al-
leged child victims to testify outside the defendant's presence violated
the state constitution. ["t In addressing child witness shielding for the
first time, the Massachusetts court expressed its strong disapproval of
the state statute that permitted the shielded testimony at defendant
Robert Bergstrom's trial." 2 The Massachusetts child witness shielding
statute has not been repealed or amended, but the state's highest
court. continues to hold that shielded testimony violates article 12 of
the state constitution, effectively barring application of the stautte." 3
For example, in 1994 in Commonwealth vlohnson, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court maintained its position that the right of face-to-
face confrontation was mandatory with no exceptions in Massachusetts,
responding directly to the federal Craig decision.'" The Johnson court
ruled that the trial judge violated the defendant's confrontation right
when he allowed a special seating arrangement during the testimony of
the child witnesses, alleged rape victims." 5 The Massachusetts court
reasoned that protection of victims cannot come at the expense of de-
fendants' fundamental rights. 146 The Johnson court also expressed con-
cerns about negative inferences about the defendant that jurors might
draw from the special seating arrangement." 7 Recognizing its duty to
protect children, the court indicated that accommodations other than
140 Donahue, supra note 30, at 47; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 160 (2000); 140N.
PAUL" LIACOS ET AL., HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 56-57,266-67 (7th ed.
1999).
141 524 N.E.2d 366,367,377-78 (Mass. 1988).
142 Id. at 367, 368-69, 374, 377; see MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 278, § 16D; LIACOS ET AL., su-
pra note 140, at 266-67.
140 LIACOS El' AL., Supra note 140, at 266-67; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 160;
Commonwealth v. Amirault, 677 N.E.2d 652.662 (Mass. 1997) (holding that special seat-
ing arrangement which prevented defendant from seeing minor witness's face violated
article 12 of the Massachusetts constitution); Johnson, 631 N.E.2d at 1004-05,1007.
144 Johnson, 631 N.E.2d at 1006-07; see Donahue, supra note 30, at 43-44.
145 631 N.E.2d at 1004,1007. Although there is some dispute as to the specifics of the
seating arrangement at issue, it appears that the child witnesses sat near the court re-
porter's table, rather than at the witness stand, facing the jury. Id. at 1004-05. The ques-
tioning attorney sat between the witnesses and the jury. Id. This seating arrangement
blocked defendant James Johnson's view of the child witnesses' faces. Id.
148 See id. at 1005-07.
147 Id. at 1006; see Schwalb, supra note 31, at 200-02 (describing presumption of guilt
created by shielding procedures).
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shielding procedures may be made for child witnesses that do not in-
crease the risk of false convictions, such as pretrial counseling. 148
Despite explicit face-to-face constitutional provisions, some state
courts have adopted the functional approach to confrontation clause
interpretation in the context of witness shielding.'" Kentucky, for ex-
ample, has a state confrontation clause that includes the "face to face"
language. 15° Following the federal trend, however, the Kentucky courts
have permitted exceptions to the confrontation right for child
nesses in the form of closed-circuit television. 151 Acknowledging the
framers' original intent, the Kentucky Supreme Court reasoned that.
the drafters of the state confrontation clause could not have foreseen
the technology that allows shielding mechanisms today.'" Similarly, in
1998, in Slate v. Foster, the Washington Supreme Court. held that an al-
leged child sexual abuse victim could testify outside the courtroom de-
spite the wording of the state constitution,'" That court then stated
that the Washington constitution in essence did not differ significantly
from the federal one, 154
 Furthermore, at least one state whose constitu-
tion contained the "face to face" phraseology has amended its confron-
tation provision in response to the issue of child witness testimony to
allow for shielding procedures. 155
Among the states that permit. child witness shielding procedures,
either because their confrontation clauses are identical to the federal
one or because they do not interpret the phrase "face to face" literally,
child witness shielding statutes vary considerably. 156
 Some follow Craig
by permitting one-way closed-circuit television, and others allow two-
"8 See Johnson, 631 N.E,2d at 1007.
148 See Donahue, supra note 30, at 45-46; Schwalb, supra note 31, at 209-10.
155
 Ky. CONST. § 11 ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused has the right
	 to meet
the witnesses face to face . • ..").
151 Donahue, supra note 30, at 45-46; see Commonwealth v. Willis. 716 S.W,2d 224,
227-31 (Ky. 1986) (holding that the Kentucky constitution contained merely a preference
for face-to-face confrontation like the federal provision).
154 ]Millis. 716 SIA1.2d at 230, 231.
"s 957 P.2d 712. 717, 721, 726, 727 (Wash, 1998); see WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22 ("In
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to meet the witnesses against
him face to face ....").
'" Faster, 957 P.2d at 722.
155 Gillman-Johnson & Evans, supra note 1, at 695-98. The effectiveness of constitu-
tional amendments may be limited in the scant application of shielding procedures by
individual judges who resist the popular opinion. Sec id. For example, an amendment to
the Illinois constitution designed to enable witness shielding was not effective in promot-
ing change. Sec id.
tho See Richards, supra note 5, at 401-03.
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way television broadcast or videotaped testimony.' 57 They differ as to
the types of offenses that are applicable to consideration of shielding
procedures, some being limited to sexual abuse prosecutions but oth-
ers being applicable to all criminal offenses, 158 Some statutes also limit
the applicability of the statute by the victim's age. 159 State shielding
statutes also vary in the degree of trauma that must be shown, some
requiring more than de minimis distress and others requiring the in-
ability of the child to communicate at tria1. 160 Some state statutes
permit shielded testimony when children are traumatized by the
courtroom itself, despite the Craig Court's emphasis on the defendant
being the particular source of distress. 161 Lastly, the state statutes dif-
fer in the standard of proof the judge must apply in the pretrial hear-
ing before permitting shielding of the wimess. 162
NCCUSL intended the Child Witness Act as a solution to the tex-
tual and interpretational variations among state confrontation clauses
as well as the differences among existing state child shielding stat-
utes. 163 The drafters of the Child Witness Act hope to achieve uni-
formity in treatment of child witnesses at the state level through each
state's adoption of the Child Witness Act)" Now that the ABA has
approved the Child Witness Act, its delegates will petition individual
state legislatures to pass the Child Witness Act into law. 165
III. EMPIRICAL STUDIES
This Note's previous Parts traced the federal and state courts'
treatment of confrontation clauses with respect to child witness
157 Id. at 403; cf. Craig. 497 U.S. at 840-42,851.
15e Richards. supra note 5, at 402.
15° Id.
166 Id. at 401-02.
161 Id. at 403; cf. Craig. 497 U.S. at 856 (holding that the trial court must find that the
witness would be traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the
defendant").
16"_
	 supra note 5, at 402. For example, California's standard is more specific
than the Craig Court's. expressly requiring clear and convincing evidence of substantial
trauma. Id. at 402. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(b) (2) (West Stipp. 2000), with Craig,
497 U.S. at 855-57.
163 McDonough, supra note 19; see UNIV. CHILD IVITNESS TES'IlMONY BY ALTERNATIVE
METHODS ACT (2002).
164 McDonough, supra note 19; see UNIV. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALTERNATIVE
METHoDs Ac•.
165 Press Release, supra note 21; see UNIV. CHILD WITNESS TES'IlMONY BY ALTERNA'TIVE
METHODS Acr, McDonough, supra note 19; Recently Completed Uniform Act, supra note 19.
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shielding. 160 Underlying federal and state statutes, including the newly
proposed Child Witness Act, are several assumptions about the psy-
chological effects of. in-court testimony on child witnesses—
specifically, serious emotional trauma and decreased ability to
communicate with the fact finder. 167 This Part explores the empirical
bases of those assumptions by providing an overview of three groups
of studies related to children's testimony. 168 Part LILA summarizes
several studies that. analyze various features of shielded testimony and
their effects on trial outcomes. 169 Part III.B focuses on research
examining children's suggestibility and its consequences on the
accuracy of their testimony.' 7° Finally, Part III.0 highlights studies that.
assess the emotional effects of traditional courtroom testimony on
child witnesses, both at the time of trial and afterward.'''
A, Studies Analyzing Effects of Shielded Child Testimony
Beginning in the late 1980s, several teams of researchers examined
the effects of shielding procedures on five different aspects of criminal
trials: psychological effects on the child witness; jurors' perceptions of
trial fairness; prejudice to the defendant; prejudice to the child witness;
and reliability of shielded testimon): 172 With respect to the first aspect,
psychological effects of in-court testimony on the child, studies by Gail
Goodman, a social scientist specializing in child witnesses, found after
interviewing actual child witnesses that children usually fear a face-to-
face confrontation with the defendant..' Researcher Louise Dezwirek-
Sas added to Goodman's results, finding that child interviewees also
feared being hurt by the defendant, testifying on the stand, crying dur-
ing testimony, being sent to jail, and failing to understand questions
asked of them. 174
168 See supra notes 48-165 and accompanying text.
167 See Marsil et al.. supra note 1, at 211.
168 Sec infra notes 172-225 and accompanying text.
169 See infra notes 172-194 and accompanying text.
170 Sec infra notes 195-212 and accompanying text.
17' See infra notes 213-225 and accompanying text.
772 See Marsil et al., supra note 1, at 211,213-24.
179 Gail S. Goodman et al., Testifying in Criminal Court: Emotional Effects on Child Sexual
Assault Victims, MONOGRAPHS SOC'Y FIER RES. CHILD DU., Dec. 1992, at 1,100-01, discussed
in Marsil et al., supra note 1, at 214.
174 Louise Dezwirek-Sas, Empowering Child Witnesses for Sexual Abuse Prosecution, in
	 [L-
OREN AS WrrNEssEs 192,194-95 (Helen Dent & Rhonda Flirt eds., 1992), discussed in Mar-
sh 	 al., supra note 1, at 214.
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Exploring the second aspect of children's shielded testimony, ju-
rors' perceptions of trial fairness, social scientist Rod Lindsay and col-
leagues showed mock jurors videotaped simulations of a child sexual
abuse trial to assess their reactions to shielding methods. 175 In the vid-
eos, the child victim testified in open court, behind a screen, or via
closed-circuit television. 178 The mock jurors' responses indicated no
difference in their perceptions of fairness when child testimony was
delivered by any of the three methods. 177
Empirical research has revealed several pitfalls of child witness
shielding. 178 The third set of studies examined the possibility of
prejudice to the defendant resulting from shielded witnesses. 178 Re-
search by Janet Swim, .Associate Professor of Psychology at Pennsylva-
nia State University, showed that the more serious the charge, the
more jurors preferred to hear from the child witness in open court
before rendering a guilty verclict. 180 Swim based her results on a com-
parison of the mock jurors' responses to questionnaires following
presentation of simulated child sexual abuse trials in which the child
testified either live or via video deposition.m In a similar experiment
by social scientist David Ross, witness shielding reduced the likelihood
of mock jurors convicting the defendant when the child was the sole
witness at tria1. 182
The fourth set of studies addressed prejudice to child witnesses
when their testimony is shielded.' 83 A study by Goodman using live
child witness testimony and mock jurors revealed that jurors viewed
the child as less credible when shielded, despite the increased accu-
racy of the testimony. 184 In a similar experiment by psychologist Ann
175 Rod C.L. Lindsay et al.. What's Fair When a Child Testifies?, 25 J. APPLIED SOC. PSY-
CHOL. 870, 873-75, 884-85 (1995), discussed in Marsil et al., supra note 1, at 218-19.
r7s Id. at 874.
177 Id. at 878, 884-85.
118 See Marsil et al., supra note 1, at 238-41.
118 See id. at 215-17.
18° Janet K. Swim et al., Videotaped Versus In-Court Witness Testimony: Does Protecting the
Child Witness Jeopardize Duc Process?, 23 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 603, 603, 617, 626 (1993),
discussed in Marsil et al., supra note 1, at 215-17.
181 Id. at 607-08.
181 David F. Ross et al.. The Impact of Protective Shields and Videotape Testimony on Convic-
tion Rates in a Simulated Trial of Child Sexual Abuse, 18 LAW & HUNI. hEIIAV. 553, 563, 564-65
(1994), discussed in Nlarsil et al.. supra note 1, at 216-17.
181 Marsil et al., supra note 1, at 219-20.
184 Gail S. Goodman et al., Face-to-Face Confrontation: Effects of Closed-Circuit Technology on
Children's Eyewitness Testimony and flaws' Decisions, 22 LAW & Hum. IIEIIAV. 165, 195, 199
(1998), discussed in Marsil et al., supra note 1, at 219-20. Studies by Ross and Swim were
unable to replicate Goodman's results because the mock jurors watched videotaped trial
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Tobey, jurors rated children's testimony via closed-circuit television as
generally less believable. 185 The mock jurors described the children as
less credible, less able to discern fact from fantasy, less intelligent, and
less confident when testifying in the protective conclition. 18° Scholars
attribute these results to the witnesses' decreased emotion and the
jurors' reduced ability to empathize with or observe the non-verbal
cues of a witness who only appears over a television screen. 187
The fifth set of shielding studies focused on the reliability of
shielded testimony. 188 Given empirical evidence from other sources that
high levels of stress can decrease children's ability or willingness to pro-
vide accurate and complete testimony, researchers sought to determine
to what extent shielding mitigates those effects. 189 In a study by Paula
Hill and Samuel Hill, thirty-seven children, ages seven to nine, watched
a video about an unpleasant exchange between a father and daugh-
ter. 190 They were then asked to testify about the video encounter either
in the courtroom with the father present or in a small room without the
father.'" The results demonstrate that the children gave more detailed
and accurate testimony in the protective condition and were less likely
to give no response or say, "I don't know." 192 This positive effect was
amplified for younger children who participated in a similar study by
Goodman.'" Concerns have been raised, however, about the increased
likelihood of false positives being given by shielded children, possibly
demonstrated by their overall increase in response under protective
conditions. 1"
simulations rather than live child witnesses. Ross et al., supra note 182, at 560; Swim et al.,
supra note 180, at 617.
195 Ann E. Tobey et al., Balancing the Rights of Children and Defendants: Effects of Closed-
Circuit Television on Children's Accuracy and fur013 . PC1VeldiOnS, in MEMORY AND TESTIMONY IN
THE CHILD WITNESS 232-33 (Maria S. Zaragoza el al. eds., 1995), discussed in Marsil et al.,
supra note 1, at 219-20.
lee a
1112
 Schwalb, supra note 31, at 201-02.
nee SeeMarsil et al., supra note 1, at 220-23.
1119
 Kay Bussey et al., Lies and Secrets: Implications for Children's Reporting of Sexual Abuse, in
CHILD Victims, CHILD WITNESSES 162-63 (Gail S. Goodman & Bette L. Bottoms eds.,
1993); Douglas P. Peters. The Influence of Stress and Arousal on the Child Witness. in THE SUG•
crs'ngwrry or CHILDREN'S RECOLLECTIONS 74-75 (Joins Doris ed., 1991). For a discus-
sion of these studies, see Marsil et al., supra note 1, at 214-15.
190 Paula E. Hill & Samuel M. Hill, Videotaping Children's Testimony: An Empirical Vicw, 85
MICH. L. REV. 809,813,814 & n.19 (1987), discussed in Marsil et al., supra note 1, at 222.
m Id. at 814.
192 Id, at 815.
193 Goodman et al., supra note 184. at 183-86; see Marsil at al., supra note 1, at 222.
194 Sec Marsil at al., supra note 1, at 222.
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B. Studies Analyzing Children's Suggestibility
This Section describes the research of legal scholars and social
scientists who have closely examined children's suggestibility in the
context of pretrial child witness interviews. 195 The theory of children's
suggestibility has been well documented and widely accepted since
the nineteenth century.'" Suggestibility means that children's memo-
ries, thoughts, and statements are easily influenced by others, espe-
cially adults, regardless of their truthfulness. 07 Suggestibility is a natu-
ral consequence of children's level of cognitive and social
development. 198 Cognitively, children, particularly in their preschool
years, are often unable to distinguish clearly between fact and fantasy,
incorporating a hybrid of each into their statements and narratives.'"
Socially, children yearn for acceptance and approval, especially from
adults, and may provide inaccurate answers when they perceive a posi-
tive response. 2"
Children's suggestibility affects their role as witnesses, particularly
in criminal prosecutions. 201 Child abuse investigators often use lead-
ing or repeated questions accompanied by props like anatomical dolls
because of psychological evidence that children give less-complete
responses when asked open-ended questions. 202 Children may also
have difficulty communicating with the investigator, requiring more
direct and persistent questioning. 2" These same techniques, however,
increase the likelihood of false positive responses—responses that
wrongfully accuse defendants—because of children's suggestibility. 2"
195 Sec infra notes 196-212 and accompanying text.
196 See Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children: Scientific Re-
search and Legal Implications, 86 ConNELL L. REV. 33, 34 (2000). Early studies by French
psychologist Alfred Billet over a century ago first documented the theory of children's
suggestibility. Id. at 39. Billet made four conclusions relevant to this discussion: children's
suggestibility arises from a desire to conform to interviewers' expectations; the accuracy of
children's responses is tied to the nature and format of the questions; children's errone-
ous responses become engrained in their memory; and children are more suggestible in
groups. Id. at 39-43.
197 Matthew H. Scullin et al, Measurement of Individual Differences in Children's Suggestibil-
ity Across Situations, 8 J. EXPERIMENTAL. PSYCIIOL,: APPLIED 233, 234, http://www.apa.org/
journals/xap/press_releases/december_2002/xap84233.pdf (2002).
198 Ceci & Friedman, supra note 196, at 39-13; see Beckett, supra note 16, at 1606-07,
1633-35; Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 200-01.
199 Beckett, supra note 16, at 1606-07, 1633-35.
200 See Ceci & Friedman, supra note 196, at 40; Beckett, supra note 16, at 1634-35.
201
 Sec Ceci & Friedman, supra note 196, at 39-46.
202 See id. at 45-16.
" Id.
264 Id. at 46.
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Analyses by professors Stephen J. Ceci and Richard D. Friedman
sought to determine the extent to which interviewing techniques
influence the content of children's testimony. 2°5 Ceci and Friedman
focused on four studies by Goodman and her colleagues that they felt
demonstrated children's vulnerability to suggestion.m In each study,
Goodman's researchers interviewed children about nonsexual contact
they had with a strange adult. 207 For example, in "The Trailer Study,"
researchers left thirty-six children, in pairs, to play in a trailer with an
adult they had never inet. 2" In this study, as well as the other three,
some of the children agreed with the interviewer's false suggestion
that the stranger had engaged in inappropriate touching with them. 209
After analyzing the results of all four Goodman studies, Ceci and
Friedman revealed false positive response rates varying from three to
forty percent. 21 ° Ceci and Friedman reasoned that even false positive
response rates as low as three percent posed a significant risk of false
convictions in the legal context. 211
 Ceci and Friedman suggest that
children's suggestibility makes defendants' need for Sixth Amend-
ment protection especially compelling.212
C. Studies Analyzing the Emotional Effects of Face-to-Face
Testimony on Child Witnesses
The last set of studies included in this Section analyzes the emo-
tional effects of in-court testimony on young witnesses. 2n For exam-
ple, one empirical study has shown that five months after testifying in
sexual abuse cases, children who testified in court were faring as well
205 See id. at 34.
206 See Ceci & Friedman, supra note 196, at 46-53. The four studies analyzed by Ceci
and Friedman were "The Pediatric Exam Study" by Goodman and Karen Saywitz; "The
Delayed Inquiry Study" by Goodman; "The Trailer Study" by Goodman and Leslie Rudy;
and "The Mt. Sinai Study" by Goodman and Mitchell Eisen. Id.
"7 Id. at 46-52.
20n Id. at 48119.
2°9 Id. at 46-52. In "The Trailer Study." approximately three to seven percent of chil-
dren agreed with the interviewer's false suggestions of sexual abuse. Id. at 49. Further-
more, "The Delayed Inquiry Study," following a similar format, revealed that one-third of
the children supplied incorrect answers that indicated 'inappropriate touching by the
adult. Id. at 48.
21 ° Id. at 53.
211 Ceci & Friedman. septa note 196, at 49,81, 84.
212 See id. at 84.
21$
	 infra notes 214-225 and accompanying text.
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as, if not better than, those who did not. 214 Even eighteen months af-
ter providing testimony, children in another study demonstrated no
differences in self-esteem or behavior from children who did not pro-
vide in-court testimony.215
In fact, some social scientists and legal scholars believe that chil-
dren may find open court testimony to be therapeutic, due to the
sense of retribution and empowerment the criminal justice system can
provide to victims.216 Prosecutors, parents, and therapists often un-
derestimate a child's emotional ability to testify in court. 217 To demon-
strate this point, law professor Jean Montoya examined transcripts of
sexual abuse trials in which therapists testified during a pretrial hear-
ing to determine the necessity of shielding a child witness. 218 Montoya
reveals that in the transcript of one case, People v. Akiki, seven of twelve
child witnesses indicated to the judge that they were capable of testify-
ing in the defendant's presence. 29 The therapists, however, testified
that the children would be unable to do so. 220 In denying the prosectt-
don's motion for shielded testimony in that case, the judge indicated
that the children were not as fragile as their therapists claitned. 221
Conversely, other studies reveal adverse effects of testifying on
child witnesses due to such factors as multiple interviews, lengthy de-
lays and continuances, confronting the defendant at trial, and harsh
courtroom question ing. 222 Still, very few evaluations of shielding pro-
cedures have been conducted to measure their actual effectiveness in
reducing psychological harm to children.223 In fact, lack of trial
preparation may account for a great deal of the trauma experienced
by child witnesses. 224 Despite the inconsistencies in empirical data on
214 Sec Gail S. Goodman et al., Innovations for Child Ilitnesses: A National Sigrvey, 5 Pay.
C.1101.., rye. POL'V, & L. 255, 258 (1999).
212 Id.
216 See id.
217 Jean Montoya, Lessons from Akiki and Michaels on Shielding Child Witnesses, 1 Pay-
cum, Puts. POLY, & L. 340,363 (1995).
2I8 Id. at 356-62.
219 Id. at 361. In the People v. .Akiki child sexual abuse case, eleven children testified with-
out the aid of shielding procedures. Id. at 343-46 (citing People v. Akiki, No. CR. 129395
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1993)).
229 Id. at 362-63.
221
 Id. at 363.
222 Goodman et al., supra note 214, at 258.
229
 See id. at 259.
224 Sec, e.g., State v. Foster, 957 P.2d 712,715 (Wash. 1998) (permitting shielding pro-
cedure for traumatized child witness who kepi repeating, didn't know [defendant] was
going to be [at trial].").
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the subject, shielding statutes, including the Child Witness Act, con-
tinue to utilize shielding procedures. 225
IV. ANALYSIS: THE ACT SHOULD NOT BE ADOPTED
BY THE STATES AS DRAFTED
In the struggle to balance child witnesses' and defendants' rights,
the Child Witness Act unjustly compromises the constitutional rights
of the accused. 226 Therefore, despite recent ABA approval, states
should not adopt the Child Witness Act. 227
 First, the Child Witness Act.
falls below the standards of the Federal Confrontation Clause, as in-
terpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Matyland v. Craig. 228 Second,
even if the Child Witness Act passes federal constitutional muster, it
undeniably violates many state constitutional provisions, the drafters
of which intentionally heightened criminal defendants' constitutional
protections.229 Finally; the Child Witness Act runs contrary to impor-
tant public policy principles, eroding the criminal justice system. 23°
A. Act's Unconstitutionality Under Federal Standards
The Court's holding in Craig set the federal standard for excep-
tions to the Sixth Amendment. Confrontation Clause in the child wit-
ness context. 231
 Therefore, no state or federal witness shielding statute
can provide less protection to criminal defendants than that provided
by the Federal Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Craig.232 The Child
Witness Act, however, is unconstitutionally broader in application
than the Craig holding in three respects, thus providing significantly
less protection to criminal defenclants. 2H First, the Child Witness Act
encompasses virtually any technologically feasible shielding proce-
dure and even accommodates as-yet undeveloped technology in its
225 Sec. e.g., UNIT. CHILD WrINEss TESTIMONY BY ALTERNATIVE Minions ACT (2002);
supra notes 172-224 and accompanying text.
228 See UNIT. CHILD	 ESS TESTIMONY 1W ALTERNATIVE 1%,1F11101/S ACT.
227 Sec id.; Press Release. supra note 21. As of the close of the 2003 state legislative ses-
sions, only three states—Idaho, Nevada, and Oklahoma—had enacted the Child Witness
Act. Uniform Law Commissioners, Child Witness Testimony by Alternative Methods Act Sum-
mary, at littp://www.ticctisLorg/ncoisl/ActSearchRestilts,aspx (last visited Jan. 6, 2004).
228 See infra notes 231-267 and accompanying text.
229 See infra notes 268-281 and accompanying text.
2" Sec infra notes 282-301 and accompanying text.
231 497 U.S. 836,849-50,855-56 (1990); see U.S. CONST. amend VI.
232 497 U.S. at 849-50,855-56.
2" See infra notes 237-267 and accompanying text.
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provisions. 234 Second, the Child Witness Act does not limit the con-
siderations by which judges could permit shielding procedures in
their courtrooms.236 Lastly, the Child Witness Act does not limit the
types of cases in which shielding methods may be used. 236
The provisions of the Child Witness Act place no limitations on the
types of shielding procedures that courts may use. 237 Section 2(1) (C) of
the Child Witness Act encompasses in its definition of "alternative
method" any procedures by which witnesses testify outside defendants'
presence.238 Courts may employ shielding procedures in criminal pro-
ceedings if the section 5 standard of proof is met. 239 The Child Witness
Act contains no other restrictions upon the type of witness shielding
methodology judges may permit in their courtrooms, despite the Craig
Court's insistence on reliability of witness shielding formats. 240
Admittedly, judicial and legislative innovations since Craig have
included a variety of witness shielding formats. 241 The Federal
CVCWR statute, for example, permits testimony via two-way television
and videotape.242 Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the CVCWR's constitutionality in 1993 in United Slates v. Garcia, the
U.S. Supreme Court has held only that one-way closed-circuit televi-
sion is permissible.213 Although the Craig Court found sufficient reli-
ability in Maryland's one-way closed-circuit procedure, it did not pro-
vide a blanket approval of all shielding procedures. 244 The Court has
never ruled on the constitutionality of other legislative innovations
that permit videotaped or two-way closed-circuit testhnony. 245
The Child Witness Act goes beyond current versions of state and
federal shielding procedures to any other conceivable, or as-yet in-
conceivable, method in which the child is able to testify outside the
234 See infra notes 237-248 and accompanying text.
233 Sec infra notes 249-258 and accompanying text.
233 Sec infra notes 259-264 and accompanying text.
237 See U IF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALTEIINKI1VE METHODS ACT § 2(1) & cmt.
(2002).
238 Sec id. § 2(1).
239 See id. § 5. Under section 5(a) (2), if the presiding officer finds by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the child will suffer serious emotional trauma impairing his or her ability
to communicate, the judge may permit the child to avoid face-to-face confrontation. Id.
24° Id. § 2(1); see497 U.S. at 850.
241 See Richards, supra note 5, at 399-403.
242 Id. at 399-401.
243 7 F.3(1 885,888 (9th Cir. 1993); Richards, supra note 5, at 399A00.
244 See 497 U.S. at 851-52.
245 See id. at 852; Howard, supra note 59, at 701.
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defendant's presence.24° The Child Witness Act would give broad lati-
tude to judges and magistrates to devise their own strategies for the
protection of child witnesses. 247 Rather than. fostering uniformity in
the treatment. of child witnesses, the Child Witness Act would pro-
mote a broad range of procedural variations, many of which could
compromise defendants' confrontation rights. 248
The second reason the Child Witness Act is impermissibly
broader than Craig is due to its absence of limitations on the types of
factors judges may consider when determining the necessity of a
shielding method. 249 In addition to requiring reliability of the shield-
ing procedure, the Craig majority also required a showing of its neces-
sity to further a compelling state interest. 250 The Court had previously
emphasized in Coy v. Iowa that such policy exceptions to the Confron-
tation Clause were limited and insisted upon individualized findings
of necessity when Confrontation Clause exception issues arise. 251
The Court in Coy and Craig only addressed protection of child
abuse victims in the witness shielding con text. 252 Although the Court
did not negate the possibility of other valid policy considerations, it
set a high standard by requiring witness shielding to be necessary to
further a compelling, or important, slate interest. 255 The Child Wit-
ness Act, however, offers no such guidelines for the policy considera-
tions judicial officers may make when faced with the issue.254 In fact,
the Child Witness Act does not expressly include a requirement that
exceptions to confrontation rights be based on any finding of compel-
ling public policy. 255 Instead, section 6 of the Child Witness Act sug-
gests seven non-exclusive factors for judges to consider, none of which
246 See UNIE. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY A1:11:RNATIVE METTIODS ACT § 2(1) Dm.
(2002); McDonough, supra note 19.
247 See McDonough. supra note 19; Recently Completed Uniform Act. supra note 19; see also
UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALTERNATIVE ME1110DS ACT.
248 See McDonough, supra note 19.
249 See UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALTERNATIVE METIIODS ACT § 6; see also
497 U.S. at 849-50, 855.
258 See 497 U.S. at 849-50. 855.
251 See487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988).
252 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 852-55; Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020-21. It is somewhat unclear
whether Craig identified the compelling state interest as protection of child abuse victims
or, snore specifically. the protection of child sexual abuse victims, as the opinion uses both
labels. Sec 497 U.S. at 852-55. That ambiguity. however, is irrelevant for the purposes of the
foregoing discussion. See id.
253 See Craig 497 U.S. at 852-55.
254 SCCUNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY RV ALTERNACEPVE METIIOI)S Ac'r § 6.
255 See id.
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encompasses a public policy consideration. 256 The U.S. Supreme
Court has unequivocally required that a compelling state interest or
public policy be furthered by an exception to defendants' confronta-
tion rights.257 Yet, the Child Witness Act ignores this key element of
the Coy and Craig holdings, consequentially lowering the threshold by
which state judges may permit shielding procedures. 258
Finally, the Child Witness Act is unconstitutional because it does
not restrict the application of shielding procedures for child witnesses
to specific types of criminal proceedings, unlike most existing state
statutes on the subject. 259 Because the Child Witness Act does not
limit permissible policy exceptions to protection of child abuse vic-
tims, it could be applied to all kinds of criminal matters. 260 The Child
Witness Act could apply to trials in which the child was not a victim at
all, but merely a third-party observer of a robbery, for example.m
As long as the child meets the threshold standard of emotional
trauma required under section 5 of the Child Witness Act, a judge
could permit an exception to the defendant's confrontation rights,
regardless of the witness's relation to the alleged crime. 262 Clearly, a
robbery case does not raise the same policy concerns regarding child
welfare as does a child abuse prosecution, due to the especially despi-
cable nature of sexual abuse.263 By permitting shielded testimony in
any type of criminal proceeding, the Child Witness Act deviates sub-
stantially from the limited applicability of witness shielding contem-
plated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Coy and Craig. 264
States should not adopt the Child Witness Act because it would be
unlikely to sustain a federal constitutional challenge. 265 Because the
Child Witness Act does not narrowly tailor the types of permissible
shielding methods, the factors to be considered by a judge in deciding
255 See id.
257 Sec Craig, 497 U.S. 852-55; Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020-21.
255 See UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY AVITRNATIVE NIETTIODS ACT § 6; Craig,
497 U.S. 852-55; Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020-21.
269 See UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALTERNATIVE MET -HODS ACT § 2(3); Re-
cently Completed Uniform Act, supra note 19.
255 See UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALTERNATIVE NIETHODS ACT § 2(3); Re-
cently Completed Uniform Act, supra note 19.
261 See UNIV. CHILD WITNESS TESTIMONY BY ALTERNATIVE METHODS ACT § 2(3).
262 Sec id. § 5.
263 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 852-56 (highlighting judicial and legislative recognition of a
state's interest in protecting minor victims of sex crimes).
261 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 852-56; Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020-21; UNIF. CHILD WrrivEss TES-
TIMONY BY ALTERNATIVE NIETIIODS ACT§ 2(3).
265 See supra notes 231-264 and accompanying text.
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whether to permit shielding in a particular trial, or the types of cases in
which the methods may be used, it falls below the federal constitutional
standards articulated by the Craig Court. 266 Without further guidance
from the U.S. Supreme Court regarding child witness shielding, it is
presumptuous to enact such a drastic deviation from the Court's hold-
ing in Craig207
B. Act's Unconstitutionality Under State Standards
Even if the Child Witness Act satisfies the standards of the Fed-
eral Confrontation Clause, it. violates several state confrontation provi-
sions.268 Some states whose confrontation clauses contain the words
"face to face" have interpreted that language literally, resisting child
witness shielding procedures on state constitutional grounds.269 The
Federal Constitution provides merely a minimum threshold by which
states measure the rights they afford to their own citizens." States
have always been free to draft provisions that provide equal or greater
rights, including rights of criminal defendants." With respect to con-
frontation rights, several states, like Massachusetts, have consciously
sought. to enhance protection of criminal defendants and have consis-
tently applied that intention to the issue of shielded testimony."
To accommodate the proposed Child Witness Act, those states in-
terpreting literally their confrontation clauses' "face to face" language
would have to amend their constitutions or reverse precedents on the
subject." Such actions are an unlikely result, judging by the strong op-
position to the Craig holding demonstrated by the highest court in
Massachusetts, for instance." Massachusetts already has a statute pro-
viding for shielded child witness testimony, but its state courts have con-
sistently barred application of the provision." Likewise, adoption of
the Child Witness Act., without. an accompanying state constitutional
amendment, could meet significant judicial resistance in sonic jurisdic-
tions, either from an entire state court system or from individual judges
266 See supra notes 231-264 and accompanying text.
267 See supra notes 231-264 and accompanying text.
268 See Donahue, supra note 30, at 41-48.
266 Sec supra notes 131-148 and accompanying text.
270 Sec Donahue, supra note 30. at 47-48.
271 Sec id.
272 Sec supra notes 131-148 and accompanying text.
273 See supra notes 131-148 and accompanying text.
274 See supra notes 141-148 and accompanying text.
276 See supra notes 141-148 and accompanying text.
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opposed to child witness shielding. 276 Because the Child Witness Act is
so broad and flexible, state judges can, in their discretion, permit the
use of shielding methods on a very limited basis. 277
Those states that already allow some form of child witness shield-
ing should also hesitate to adopt such a broad provision. 278 Despite
the policy-driven trend to increase protection of children, states still
have a duty to guarantee defendants' constitutional rights. 279 The
Child Witness Act threatens those rights by overreaching constitu-
tional boundaries, or at the very least, disregarding states' legal
standpoints. 280 Some states will decline to adopt the Child Witness
Act, but even in states where the Child Witness Act becomes law, the
boundless interpretive and discretionary possibilities it provides will
lead to countless variations on child shielding mechanisms in state
family, probate, trial, and appellate courts around the country. 281
C. Negative Consequences of the Act from a Policy Perspective
Aside from constitutional considerations, child witness shielding
procedures perpetuate a number of grave public policy ramifications,
many revealed by empirical evidence.282 Given the reality that some
defendants are falsely accused, and especially considering the nature
of child abuse allegations, the problems associated with shielded tes-
timony are particularly inexcusable. 283 Rather than expanding the ap-
plicability of shielding procedures as the Child Witness Act does, stat-
utes should limit the use of shielded testimony. 284
First, at a most basic level, child witness shielding diminishes the
presumption of innocence guaranteed to defendants in criminal pro-
ceedings.285 When a child witness testifies outside the presence of the
defendant, the jury is likely to assume that the child is afraid of the de-
fendant. 288 From that assumption, the jury may easily infer that the child
276 See supra notes 131-148 and accompanying text.
277 See UNIF. CHILD WEINESS TES'ElMONY BY ALTERNATIVE MIE'llIODS Acrr (2002); Gil-
leratt-Johnson & Evans, supra note 1, at 695-98; McDonough, supra note 19; Recently Com-
pleted Uniform Act, supra note 19.
278 See UNIV. CHILD ‘VrINF...SS TES"EIMONY BY ALTERNATIVE METHODS ACT.
276 Sec Beckett, supra note 16, at 1622; Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 208.
"0 See RiPin notes 131-148,226-279 and accompanying text.
281
 Sec supra notes 226-279 and accompanying text.
282 Sec infra notes 285-301 and accompanying text.
285 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 196-99.
284 See UNIF. CHILD WITNESS TES'EBIONY BY ALTERNATIVE METHODS Acrr (2002).
2811 See Schwalb, supra note 31, at 200-02.
288 See id.
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fears the defendant because he or she committed the alleged acts that
are the subject of the tria1. 287
 The constitutionally guaranteed presump-
tion of innocence is thus transformed into a presumption of 010 9
Second, social science research has revealed that witness shielding
may bias juries against child witnesses. 289
 In particular, studies have
shown that jurors are less likely to believe child witnesses and more re-
luctant to convict defendants, especially of more serious crimes, when
the witnesses are shielded. 29° Children, therefore, are spared a few
moments or hours of distress on the witness stand only to increase the
likelihood that a guilty defendant will be released back into society po-
tentially to commit the same offenses."'
Another group of studies has raised doubts about the reliability of
child witness testimony clue to child•en's suggestibility, especially in
child abuse investigations. 292 On the one hand, empirical evidence
gathered under shielded conditions has shown an overall increased
willingness of child witnesses to respond and to give more frequent and
detailed responses.2" On the other hand, statistical research also has
revealed an accompanying rise in false positives. 294 The risk of such re-
sults is unacceptable in ally criminal justice system, but particularly one
that favors freeing the guilty over convicting the innocen 1. 295
 The espe-
cial suggestibility of children makes defendants' constitutional protec-
tions, including confrontation, even more necessary than when dealing
with adult witnesses. 296 Therefore, judges and legislatures should re-
quire empirical documentation of the effects of each proposed shield-
ing method on children's testimonial accuracy before implementing
those procedures in courtrooms. 297
Finally, a third group of studies has suggested that children may
not be as distressed at the prospect of testifying in court as therapists
and prosecutors contend.'" Furthermore, longitudinal studies have
raised doubts as to whether all children are emotionally harmed in the
287 See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 631 N.E.2(1 1002,1006 (Mass. 1994); Schwalb, supra
note 31, at 200-02.
288 Schwalb, WPM note 31, at 200; see Johnson, 631 N.E.2t1 at 1006.
289 Sec sliPra notes 178-187 and accompanying text.
29° Sec SUPPl? notes 178-187 and accompanying text.
291 See Marshl et al., supra note 1, at 215-17.
292 See supra notes 195-212 and accompanying text.
293 See supra notes 188-194 and accompanying text.
294 See supra notes 201-212 and accompanying text.
295 See Ceci & Friedman, supra note 196, at 34.
298 See id. at 49,81,84.
297 See Small & Schwartz, supra note 10, at 129-30.
298 See supra notes 217-221 and accompanying text.
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long run by testifying in court, face to face with defendants. 299 Prosecu-
tors, judges, and parents may be too eager to spare young children the
distress of open court testimony, not only denying defendants their
constitutionally guaranteed rights but also denying children the chance
to be empowered by taking the stand.") Pretrial educational programs
for young witnesses could help reduce the anxiety of confrontation
while affording defendants their Sixth Amendment rights." 1
CONCLUSION
Promotion of child witness protection is a worthy and important
goal of state legislatures and judicial officers. That objective, however,
should not be pursued through abrogation of the constitutional rights
of criminal defendants, particularly when they are accused of the most
atrocious of crimes—sexual offenses against children. As the most re-
cent step in the trend toward enhanced child witness protection, the
states should not adopt the Child Witness Act because it impermissi-
bly diminishes defendants' rights.
The Child Witness Act falls below the federal constitutional stan-
dards set forth in Maryland v. Craig by failing to place limitations on
shielding procedures' applicability. The Child Witness Act also violates
the constitutions of states whose confrontation clauses purposely
heighten protections for criminal defendants beyond the federal stan-
dard. Finally, the Child Witness Act fails to address the adverse conse-
quences witness shielding has for both defendants and child witnesses:
for defendants, a presumption of guilt and reduced reliability of child
witness testimony; for child witnesses, a loss of credibility as witnesses
and the potential emotional benefits of open court testimony.
Therefore, proposed statutes like the Child Witness Act should
seek to limit the use of shielding procedures to only the most reliable
methods and most compelling circumstances. Statutory provisions
should be accompanied by guidelines for pretrial witness education
and preparation that encourage direct confrontation between wit-
nesses and defendants. The Child Witness Act instead sacrifices the
rights of criminal defendants for the sake of benefits to child wit-
nesses that may not actually exist.
KATHERINE W. GREARSON
299 See supra notes 213-216 and accompanying text
300 SeeMontoya, supra note 217, at 363.
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